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Section I Use of English

Part A

Directions: Read the following text. Choose the best word(s) for each numbered blank and mark A,B,C or D on ANSWER SHEET 1.(10 points)

The basic function of money is the enable buying to be separated from selling, thus permitting trade to take place without the so鐬攁lled double coincidence of barter. If a person has something to sell and wants something else 1 return, it is not necessary to search for someone able and 2to make the desired exchange of items. The person can sell the 3 item for general purchasing power—that is, “money”—to anyone who wants to buy it and then use the proceeds to buy the desired item from anyone who wants to sell it.

 
The importance of this function of money is 4 illustrated by the experience of Germany just after World War 鈪�, 5 paper money was 6 largely useless because, despite inflationary conditions, price controls were effectively 7 by the American, French, and British armies of occupation. People had to8 to barter or to inefficient money substitutes. The result was to cut total output of the economy in half. The German “economic miracle” just after 1948 reflected partly a currency reform by the occupation authorities, 9 some economists hold that it stemmed primarily from the German government’s 10 of all price controls, 11 permitting a money economy to 12 a barter economy.

13 of the act of sale from the act of purchase 14 the existence of something that will be generally accepted in payment—this is the “15 of exchange” function of money. But there must also be something that can serve as a 16 abode of purchasing power, in which the seller holds the proceeds in the interim 17 the first sale and the 18 purchase, or from which the buyer can 19the general purchasing power with which to pay 20 what is bought. This is the “asset” function of money.

1. 锛籄锛� on 锛籅锛� in 锛籆锛� by 锛籇锛� for

2. 锛籄锛� capable 锛籅锛� likely 锛籆锛� desirable 锛籇锛� willing

3. 锛籄锛� excess 锛籅锛� extra 锛籆锛� surplus 锛籇锛� ample

4. 锛籄锛� dramatically 锛籅锛� urgently 锛籆锛� faithfully 锛籇锛� incidentally

5. 锛籄锛� when 锛籅锛� before 锛籆锛� since 锛籇锛� until

6. 锛籄锛� developed 锛籅锛� reserved 锛籆锛� rendered 锛籇锛� imagined

7. 锛籄锛� encouraged 锛籅锛� enlarged 锛籆锛� endured 锛籇锛� enforced

8. 锛籄锛� conform 锛籅锛� resort 锛籆锛� commit 锛籇锛� gear

9. 锛籄锛� and 锛籅锛� but 锛籆锛� therefore 锛籇锛� however

10. 锛籄锛� deprivation 锛籅锛� stimulation 锛籆锛� elimination 锛籇锛� restriction

11. 锛籄锛� thereby 锛籅锛� therefore 锛籆锛� then 锛籇锛� while

12. 锛籄锛� alternate 锛籅锛� establish 锛籆锛� substitute 锛籇锛� replace

13. 锛籄锛� Introduction 锛籅锛� Specification 锛籆锛� Representation 锛籇锛� Separation

14. 锛籄锛� assumes 锛籅锛� requires 锛籆锛� focuses 锛籇锛� undertakes

15. 锛籄锛� medium 锛籅锛� function 锛籆锛� role 锛籇锛� nature

16. 锛籄锛� fashionable 锛籅锛� favorable 锛籆锛� temporary 锛籇锛� token

17. 锛籄锛� both 锛籅锛� for 锛籆锛� between 锛籇锛� after

18. 锛籄锛� consequent 锛籅锛� relevant 锛籆锛� inadequate 锛籇锛� subsequent

19. 锛籄锛� execute 锛籅锛� extract 锛籆锛� exceed 锛籇锛� exchange

20. 锛籄锛� for 锛籅锛� off 锛籆锛� back 锛籇锛� in

Section 鈪� Reading Comprehension

Part A

Directions:

Read the following four texts. Answer the questions below each text by choosing A, B, C or D. Mark your answers on ANSWER SHEET 1. (40 points)

Text 1

Two related paradoxes also emerge from the same basic conception of the aesthetic experience. The first was given extended consideration by Hegel, who argued roughly as follows: our sensuous attention and that gives to the work of art its peculiar individuality. Because it addresses itself to our sensory appreciation, the work of art is essentially concrete, to be understood by an act of perception rather than by a process of discursive thought.

At the same time, our understanding of the work of art is in part intellectual; we seek in it a conceptual content, which it presents to us in the form of an idea. One purpose of critical interpretation is to expound this idea in discursive form—to give the equivalent of the content of the work of art in another, nonsensuous idiom. But criticism can never succeed in this task, for, by separating the content from the particular form, it abolishes its individuality. The content presented then ceases to be the exact content of that work of art. In losing its individuality, the content loses its aesthetic reality; it thus ceases to be a reason for attending to the particular work and that first attracted our critical attention. It cannot be this that we saw in the original work and that explained its power over us.

For this content, displayed in the discursive idiom of the critical intellect, is no more than a husk, a discarded relic of a meaning that eluded us in the act of seizing it. If the content is to be the true object of aesthetic interest, it must remain wedded to its individuality: it cannot be detached from its “sensuous embodiment” without being detached from itself. Content is, therefore, inseparable from form and form in turn inseparable from content. (It is the form that it is only by virtue of the content that it embodies.)

Hegel’s argument is the archetype of many, all aimed at showing that it is both necessary to distinguish form from content and also impossible to do so. This paradox may be resolved by rejecting either of its premises, but, as with Kant’s antinomy, neither premise seems dispensable. To suppose that content and form are inseparable is, in effect, to dismiss both ideas as illusory, since no two works of art can then share either a content or a form-the form being definitive of each work’s individuality.

In this case, no one could ever justify his interest in a work of art by reference to its meaning. The intensity of aesthetic interest becomes a puzzling, and ultimately inexplicable, feature of our mental life. If, on the other hand, we insist that content and form are separable, we shall never be able to find, through a study of content, the reason for attending to the particular work of art that intrigues us. Every work of art stands proxy for its paraphrase. An impassable gap then opens between aesthetic experience and its ground, and the claim that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable is thrown in doubt.

21. Hegel argued that .

锛籄锛� it is our sensuous appreciation that gives peculiar individuality to the work of art

锛籅锛� it is the content of the work of art that holds our attention

锛籆锛� the work of art cannot be understood without a process of logical thinking

锛籇锛� the form of the work of art is what our sensuous appreciation concentrates on

22. It can be inferred from this passage that .

锛籄锛� the paradox that it is both necessary to distinguish form content and also impossible to do so cannot be resolved by rejecting its premises

锛籅锛� both content and form of the work of art are illusory

锛籆锛� the content and form of the work of art are separable

锛籇锛� aesthetic experience is not intrinsically valuable

23. Which of the following is NOT what Hegel believed?

锛籄锛� The content and form of the work of art cannot be separated from each other.

锛籅锛� The content of the work of art is always the true object of aesthetic interest.

锛籆锛� The content presented without any individuality is not the content of the work of art.

锛籇锛� The content understood by means of a process of discursive thought is no more than a husk.

24. Premises that are related to each other seems to be dispensable because .

锛籄锛� Kant thinks they are indispensable

锛籅锛� either of them can resolve the paradox

锛籆锛� the premises are separated

锛籇锛� the premises can account for the theory

25. This passage is mainly about .

锛籄锛� the sensuous appreciation of art

锛籅锛� the basic conception of the aesthetic experience

锛籆锛� how to appreciate the work of art

锛籇锛� the relationship between form and content of the work of art